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Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model
Michael Heinrich Baumann
Abstract—In the literature a lot of articles about so-called
feedback-based trading strategies, i.e., strategies that compute
investment exclusively from their own gain exist. Price is therein
treated as a disturbance variable in the technical application.
With these strategies, astonishing results may be shown. How-
ever, the so-called price taker property is always assumed, that
means that one’s own trading does not affect the price, which is
quite unrealistic. In the work at hand, an interactive and thus
more realistic market model is introduced which is completely
determined by the traders’ decisions. In this market model,
distinct groups of traders can interact, e.g., feedback traders
and noise traders, as they are considered to be relevant in
economics in explaining real market prices. Furthermore, this
interactive market model is a natural generalization of the
geometric Brownian motion. Of course the model has to be
bubble-prone to be realistic. The market model will be analyzed
as well as the effects of linear feedback strategies and trading
restrictions on the price. A way to calculate thresholds for the
parameters to cause bubbles is provided. To conclude the work,
backtesting on real market data is performed.
I. MOTIVATION AND INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a lot of papers about the use of feedback-
based trading strategies on financial markets, e.g. [4] and
[5], were published. Therein, control theoretical ideas, well
known in the engeneering sciences, have been adapted to
financial market models. Trading strategies, i.e., the amount
of bought and sold shares at each point of time, are defined
without any assumptions about the market model, like the
geometric Brownian motion or other stochastic models, and
no enterprise data or business information is considered, thus,
pure feedback strategies are applied. These methods are cov-
ered by the term “technical analysis”. With this, remarkable
results may be shown like, for example, the existence of
arbitrage opportunities, see [3]. For obtaining these results,
among a few technical assumptions also the so-called price
taker property is assumed, which means, that one’s own
trading does not influence the price. This is, of course,
a justified supposition if small investors are regarded, but
usually these small investors do not use feedback strategies,
as this would exceed their capabilities. However, control-
based trading is used by large investors like funds, which
violate the price-taker assumption.
The work at hand provides a market model which does
not only allow prices to be influenced by the traders but
also that the price is determined by the traders’ buying and
selling decisions. The model will be discussed and different
trading strategies will be established. All traders influence
the price process and possibly, indirectly each other, too.
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An important ingredient of our model are the so-called
noise traders, who are non-sophisticated and act in a random
way. By incorporating noise traders, uncertainty and risk is
brought into the market. It will be shown that the resulting
market model is a natural generalization of the widely used
geometric Brownian motion. Furthermore, it is shown that
feedback-based trading strategies are able to skew prices
(which is in line with [7]) and even cause bubbles. It will be
discused how technical trading restrictions must look like in
order to prevent bubbles. The provided market model is not
supposed to map real markets, but to analyze the effects of
trading strategies.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Feedback-based Trading Strategies
It could be shown in the literature that the application of
control technology to financial markets holds great potential,
see [10] and [14]. Primbs und Barmish give an introduction
to this topic in [19], which is further elaborated by Barmish
in [2]. In [20], Primbs additionally picks up the idea of noise,
but does not consider price trends caused by the traders.
Further important literature about this subject is [8], [9],
[11], [12], [18] and [22]. One basic technique discussed in
the articles mentioned is the method of the so-called linear
feedback controller, see Fig. 1,
IFt := I
F
0 +K ·gFt , (1)
where investment IFt at time t only depends on gain or
loss gFt , initial investment I
F
0 and the feedback parameter
K > 0. Control theory is able to give mathematically rigorous
propositions about the application of control-based trading
strategies, e.g., concerning arbitrage possibilities. Therein,
the price process pt of the underlying stock does not play a
part directly and is rather treated like a disturbance variable
in the technical implementation. Particularly, the price is not
supposed to evolve according to a particular model. Using
the means of control theory, astonishing conclusions are
possible: For continuously differentiable prices a controller
may be constructed which almost surely achieves positive
return ([1], [3] and [4]) and still has a positive expectation
broker trader
gFt
IFt
pt
information information
Fig. 1. Schematical interaction between broker and feedback trader
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for the gain under the assumption that the price evolves
according to a geometric Brownian motion ([3]). Even when
applied on real historic price data, such feedback strategies
yield positive profits on the average, not mentioned yet that
there exist a lot of optimization possibilities for them. In [16],
the topic of positive profits is treated analytically, whereas
in [5] and [15] it is dealt with via simulation.
Among other technical assumptions, the so-called price
taker property, which implies that one’s own trading does
not affect the price, is presupposed. As the authors of the
respective papers often point out, this is a very restrictive
assumption as control-based trading strategies are mostly
performed by large funds. These funds are able to influence
the price in such a way, that during a transaction the price
changes because of their actions, e.g., while selling of a lot
of shares the ones selled first gain a higher price than whose
selled last (see [15]).
B. Noise
In the field of game theory, market prices are determined
by the traders’ actions, but considering solely rational traders
observed prices can only be explained insufficiently (see
[21]). E.g., a fund investing previously defined amounts
in certain stocks should always be worth as much as the
corresponding stocks. But usually this is not observed in
real markets, as funds are typically underestimated. One
possibility to explain this is to assume so-called noise, which
means unpredictable distortions (see [13] and [17]). Noise
can be brought into the model either by defining prices
with random fluctuations or by letting the traders make
decisions that are irrational from an objective point of view.
This, again, may be caused by noisy information which the
traders take for real. If equilibrium prices are computed
on markets including these so-called noise traders, a lot of
phenomena observable on real markets can be explained, as
Black describes in [6].
III. MARKET MODEL
A. Pricing
We are going to derive a market model, i.e., a price model
or price process pt , respectively, on a discrete time grid T =
{0,1, . . . ,T} or T = N0, in which price is determined by
buying and selling decisions ∆It of the traders. In order to
keep the exposition simple, in this paper wie restrict our
analysis to two types of traders, feedback traders (F) and
noise traders (N). Thus, ∆It can consist of buying and selling
decisions of the two groups of traders, that is
∆It := ∆IFt +∆I
N
t . (2)
The total investment of the trading groups at time t is given
through It =∑ti=0∆Ii, IFt =∑
t
i=0∆IFi and INt =∑
t
i=0∆INi . The
market model should satisfy the following claims: If supply
equals demand, the prices remain stable:
∆It = 0⇒ pt+1 = pt
If supply exceeds demand, prices decline and vice versa:
∆It → ∞⇒ pt+1→ ∞, ∆It →−∞⇒ pt+1→ 0 and
pt+1 strictly monotonic increasing in ∆It
The exponential function defined by
pt+1 := pt · eM−1·∆It = p0 · eM−1·It (3)
meets these requirements where M> 0 is some scaling factor
for trade volume and p0 > 0 indicates the initial price. The
gain g`t of a trader at time t is calculated as
g`t := g
`
t−1+ I
`
t−1 ·
pt − pt−1
pt−1
=
t
∑
i=1
I`i−1 ·
pi− pi−1
pi−1
, (4)
where I`t is this trader’s specific investment. If only one trader
operated on the market it can be recognized that ∆I`t →±∞
leads to g`t+1→+∞, as it is
g`t+1 = g
`
t +(I
`
t−1+∆I
`
t )(e
M−1·∆I`t −1).
This implies that, this market model is bubble-prone. In
the following, three aspects of the model will be discussed.
Uncertainty has to be added to the model, infinite investments
are unrealistic and trading restrictions have to be established.
B. Noise-Trading and Relation to Geometric Brownian Mo-
tion
Now, trading strategies for the so-called noise traders
have to be determined, that are supposed to be random but
should follow a certain distribution, i.e., they should not be
idiosyncratic. We set
∆INt :=M · ((µ− σ
2
2 )+σ ·∆Wt), (5)
where M > 0 is the scaling parameter for volumes of trade1
from (3), µ ∈R can be interpreted as saving deposit per time
step, σ > 0 specifies the so-called volatility of the market,
∆Wt
iid∼N (0,1) is a random walk that brings noise into the
market and −σ22 can be interpreted as risk aversion. This
choice of (5) leads to the result that the market model (3) is
a natural generalization of the geometric Brownian motion
(GBM)2, as the following lemma shows if we assume that
there are no feedback traders acting on the market.
Lemma 1: For IFt ≡ 0 and for all M > 0 the paths pt of
the price process follow the paths of the geometric Brownian
motion.
Proof: For this proof (2),(3) and (5) are combined. First
of all, it is computed
INt =
t
∑
i=0
∆INt =M ·
t
∑
i=0
((µ− σ22 )+σ ·∆Wt)
=M · ((µ− σ22 )(t+1)+σ ·Wt+1),
where Wt is a Wiener process. The price at time t is
pt = p0 · eM−1·(INt−1+IFt−1) = p0 · e(µ−
σ2
2 )t+σ ·Wt ,
1M ·∑T |∆INt |= ∑T “trade volume”t
2The GBM is the solution of the stochastic differential equation dSt =
µStdt+σStdWt . One can show that St = S0 · e(µ−
σ2
2 )t+σ ·Wt .
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which is also the formula for the geometric Brownian motion.
IV. EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK-BASED TRADING
In this section it shall be analyzed how our market model
behaves if there is a linear feedback trader (1) acting on the
market. By considering formula (4) for gain and loss of the
respective traders, a result about the relation between price
and investment of linear feedback traders follows.
Lemma 2: The relative change in the investment of linear
feedback traders for all price processes pt is a linear function
of the relative changes of the price process if ∀t IFt > 0, i.e.,
IFt − IFt−1
IFt−1
= K · pt − pt−1
pt−1
.
Proof: It is
IFt − IFt−1 = K · (gFt −gFt−1)
= K · IFt−1 ·
pt − pt−1
pt−1
Dividing by IFt−1 leads to the assertion.
A. Purely Linear Feedback Controller
In this subsection markets with purely linear feedback
traders shall be studied, that means INt ≡ 0. In this case, the
feedback-based investment strategy is given by
IF0 > 0,
IF1 = I
F
0 +K · IF0 · (eM
−1IF0 −1) and
IFt = I
F
t−1+K · IFt−1 · (eM
−1·(IFt−1−IFt−2)−1), t ≥ 2.
The assumption K > 0 can be changed to K ∈ (0,1] without
any changes in the results. This would be more realistic
because the traders do not have to find any credit bank if
they have IF0 at their disposal. That means, every trader is
just reinvesting a part of his gain. In all cases the properties
of this market can be shown.
Lemma 3: If INt ≡ 0, the investment IFt of the linear
feedback trader is strictly increasing in t (∆IFt > 0).
Proof: The lemma is proven by induction. Because
of eM
−1IF0 > 1 and IF0 > 0, the initial inequalitiy I
F
1 > I
F
0 is
true. The induction step follows, as eM
−1(IFt−1−IFt−2) > 1 and
IFt−1 > I
F
t−2 > .. . > 0.
It follows that IFt > 0 because of I
F
0 > 0. This means that
feedback traders’ investment will increase prices and thus
also their gain. This leads to more investment and so on. But
this does not necessarily have to end in a bubble3, because
the investment can converge to some value like in Fig. 2
on the left side. It is possible to calculate thresholds for the
initial investment so that feedback trading will cause a bubble
like in Fig. 2 on the right side4.
Theorem 1: If INt ≡ 0 and ∃t∗ ∈T : ∆IFt∗+1 > ∆IFt∗ then
∆IFt+1 > ∆I
F
t
3We say that a bubble occurs if ∃t∗ : ∆It+1 > ∆It ∀t ≥ t∗.
4Clearly, because the model is in discrete time, for all t ∈T the price is
< ∞.
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Fig. 2. Only linear feedback trader causing no bubble (left) and causing
a bubble (right) (parameters: T = 250, p0 = 1, M = 5, K = 1, IF0 = 2 (left),
IF0 = 4 (right); outputs: g
F
T = 0.592 (left), g
F
T =NaN (right))
holds for all t ≥ t∗. That means, the buyed amount of stocks
∆IFt of the feedback trader is strictly increasing for all t ≥ t∗.
Proof: The induction step
∆IFt > ∆I
F
t−1⇒ ∆IFt+1 > ∆IFt , t ≥ 1,
has to be shown. This is true because of
∆IFt+1 > ∆I
F
t ⇔ IFt · (eM
−1·∆IFt −1)> IFt−1 · (eM
−1·∆IFt−1 −1),
Lemma 3 and the induction hypothesis.
To calculate a threshold for IF0 different cases are possible:
One is, that the bubble starts at t = 0, that means:
∆IF1 > ∆I
F
0
⇔ IF1 −2 · IF0 > 0
⇔ K · IF0 · (eM
−1·IF0 −1)− IF0 > 0
⇔ IF0 >M · ln(1+ 1K )
For K = 1 and M= 10 this leads to IF0 > 6.932. But a bubble
can also arise, when
∆IF2 > ∆I
F
1
⇔ K · IF1 · (eM
−1·(IF1 −IF0 )−1)
⇔ K · (IF0 +K · IF0 · (eM
−1·IF0 −1))(eM−1·K·IF0 (eM
−1 ·IF0 −1)−1).
One calculates for K = 1 and M = 10 that this holds if IF0 >
5.071. Hence, the threshold is:
IF∗∗0 = inf{IF∗0 | ∃t : ∆IFt+1 > ∆IFt ∀IF0 > IF∗0 }
By simulation it turns out that IF∗∗0 ≈ 3.680 for K = 1
and M = 10. Thus, no infinite investments are necessary to
generate infinite gain. Even with a relatively moderate initial
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budget, financial bubbles are able to occur. At any rate, if a
bubble occurs, it cannot be stopped. It is still quite unrealistic
that the market development is deteministic, which is caused
by the fact, that only one trader is acting on the market. In
the following subsection, noise traders and feedback traders
act simultaneously on the same market.
B. Linear Feedback Controller in a Noisy Market
Now, the behaviour of linear feedback traders in noisy
markets shall be investigated. It is
pt = pt−1 · eM−1·(∆INt−1+∆IFt−1).
This may be rewritten to
pt = pt−1e(µ−
σ2
2 )+σ ·∆Wt−1eM
−1·∆IFt−1
with
e(µ−
σ2
2 )+σ ·∆Wt−1 iid∼LN (µ− σ22 ,σ2)
and LN describing the lognormal distribution. One con-
clusion is the following:
E[e(µ−
σ2
2 )+σ ·∆Wt−1 ] = eµ−
σ2
2 +
σ2
2 = eµ (6)
The dynamic of IF0 can be written as
IF0 > 0,
IF1 = I
F
0 +K · IF0 · (e(µ−
σ2
2 )+σ ·∆Wt−1 · eM−1·IF0 −1) and
IFt = I
F
t−1+K · IFt−1
· (e(µ−σ
2
2 )+σ ·∆Wt−1 · eM−1·(IFt−1−IFt−2)−1), t ≥ 2.
Analogous to the market model without noise it follows:
Lemma 4: If µ ≥ 0, the investement of linear feedback
traders IFt is strictly monotonously increasing in expectation,
i.e.,
E[IFt+1]> IFt
at time t.
Proof: The statement of the lemma is a consequence
of the proof of Lemma 3 and (6).
Furthermore, the following can be shown.
Theorem 2: If ∆IFt > ∆IFt−1 and ∆I
F
t > 0 it holds that
E[∆IFt+1]> ∆IFt
at time t provided µ ≥ 0.
Proof: The statement is proved like Theorem 1 under
application of (6).
In this market model, no fixed thresholds may be specified
but only expected ones. Simulations show that bubbles do not
need to occur (see Fig. 3) but have the chance to do so (see
Fig. 4). Also, bubbles may burst in the case that accidentally
noise traders disinvest more than feedback controllers invest.
However, this becomes more unlikely (because of the small
tails of the normal distribution) the larger the bubbles are.
That is why the next section will show how to prevent
bubbles. Clearly, in real markets some economic processes,
e.g., market regulations, would start if bubbles occur and
could let them burst which are not in the scope of this paper.
C. Trading Restrictions
To avoid bubbles, ∆IFt will be limited so that
−b≤ ∆IFt ≤ b,
for b> 0. It is supposed that one linear feedback trader and
a lot of noise traders act on the market and the investment of
the noise traders sums up to INt . Thus, |∆INt |> b is possible.
Further, (1) and (4) are generalized for IF0 > 0 to
IbFt = max{min{IF0 +KgbFt , IbFt−1+b}, IbFt−1−b},
where
gbFt = g
bF
t−1+ I
bF
t−1 ·
pt − pt−1
pt−1
.
This implies IbF0 = max{IF0 ,b}. Through simulation, for this
controller Fig. 5 was created, where it can be recognized that
bubbles can occur and burst afterwards again. This is possible
because for the limited ∆IFt the noise traders have the chance
to counteract the investment of the feedback traders, i.e., that
despite of large gains of the feedback traders the price has
a chance to fall. This may be written as:
P((µ− σ22 )+σ ·∆Wt +M−1 ·b< 0)≥ α ∈ (0,1)
which is equivalent to
Φ
(
(µ− σ22 )+M−1 ·b
σ
)
≤ 1−α
and
b≤M · (σ ·Φ−1 · (1−α)− (µ− σ22 )),
where Φ denotes the distribution function of the standard-
normal distribution. However, such b does not have to exist.
The next section is about to discover the effects of several
trading restrictions on bubble occurring using real market
data.
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Fig. 3. Linear feedback trader in a noisy market not causing a bubble
(parameters: T = 250, p0 = 1, M = 5, µ = 0.03/360, σ = 0.05, K = 1,
IF0 = 2; output: g
F
T = 0.396)
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Fig. 4. Linear feedback trader in a noisy market causing a bubble
(parameters: T = 250, p0 = 1, M = 5, µ = 0.03/360, σ = 0.05, K = 1,
IF0 = 2; output: g
F
T =NaN)
V. BACKTESTING
The purpose of this section is to examine the opening
XET-price of the “Deutsche Bank AG” stock between 2013-
08-01 and 2014-07-31, taken from Thomson Reuters Data-
stream 5.1, and how it would have developed according to
the presented model if several feedback traders influenced
the market. In doing so, various initial investments5 and
trading restrictions are studied. For this, ∆INt is computed
from the stock data, which is no longer random, but fixed
and, however, unknown to the feedback trader. In Fig. 6
the impact of different initial investments (1 ·109, 0.2 ·1010
and 0.5 · 1010) together with the uniform trading restriction
b= 1 ·1010 is shown. As it was expected, the price gets more
distorted with higher investment. In this test series, only for
an enormous investment of 0.5 ·1010 a bubble occurs6.
In Fig. 7 the effect of trading restrictions on the market is
examined. To this end, the initial investment is fixed (IF0 =
0.5 ·1010) and the bound b varies (1 ·108, 1 ·109 and 1 ·1010).
One result is that through trading restrictions the occurrence
of bubbles can be prevented and that bubbles can be let burst.
In this example, the scaling factor for the trade volume was
set to M = 13403793634. By combining (2), (3) and (5), it
can be shown that a feedback trader needs the more initial
investment to push prices the higher the trade volume of the
specific stock is.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
A. The nature of bubbles
In the work at hand, we have seen that the indroduction
of linear feedback traders in a simple market model may
5The currency unit in this section is the Euro (EUR, e).
6For comparison: The market capitalisation of the “Deutsche Bank AG”
on 2013-08-01 was circa 0.472 ·1011.
cause bubbles to appear. At a first glance, this seems to be
some kind of “money press”. But, even if a trader has nearly
infinite gain, this money is invested in stocks. For actually
getting cash, a buyer is needed and to find such one could
be a hard task. Because, if the supposed buyer notices that
he is going to trade on a financial bubble he will not invest.
Further on, selling the stocks to make money will let the
bubble burst.
B. Conclusions
All in all, it can be seen that the basic dynamic of the
market, i.e., that rising demand leads to rising prices, together
with the linear feedback controller may cause bubbles as
increasing prices with high investments lead to higher profits
and thus again to more investments and increasing prices. To
produce bubbles, however, no high investments – in relative
terms – are necessary. This changes when uncertainty and
risk enter the market. To influence the market significantly
in this noisy setting enough market power is needed, that
means that one’s own investment in relation to that of the
noise traders’ may not be too low. That means, the higher the
trading volume the greater the needed initial investment. One
idea to avoid bubbles or to let them burst is to impose trading
restrictions. In summary, the presented market model is
suitable to analyze effects of investments and disinvestments
and the occurrence of bubbles, because the so-called price-
taker property of the traders is removed.
C. Future Works
Future works may concentrate on the analysis of other
(feedback) strategies in the market model provided in the
work at hand. For example, including fundamentalists or
analyzing the simultaneous long short controller would be
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Fig. 5. Bounded linear feedback trader causing a bursting bubble (para-
meters: T = 250, p0 = 1, M = 5, µ = 0.03/360, σ = 0.05, K = 1, IF0 = 2,
b= 0.25; outputs: gFT = 0.187, max pt = 21.068, maxg
F
t = 26.787)
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of interest. This sort of controller invests in long and short
investments at the begining and subsequently shifts the
investments to that side with the greater gains. Another field
of interest could be the construction of more game-theoretic
market models in which (noisy) equilibrium strategies and
their corresponding prices can be calculated. In this setting,
the interaction of feedback based trading and equilibrium
strategies of sophisticated traders or noisy strategies, which
are on average equilibrium strategies, can be studied.
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